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Dynamics of Left-Right Party Positions: 




We investigate whether it is feasible to use the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data on 
party positioning to take account of party movements along the left-right dimension.  At issue are 
answers to two questions.  Are there discernable dynamics in party positions?  And, if so, is it 
possible to separate systematic party dynamics from measurement error so as to make effective 
use of the CMP data?  The answer to both questions is yes.  Our analysis of 81 parties across the 
post-War period detects systematic movements in the left-right positions for one third of the 
parties.  Our analysis of measurement error reveals that, as measured by the CMP, about 65% of 
the variance in party positions records reliable long-term differences across parties, another 
16% records systematic movements, and the remaining 19% is error.  We conclude with 
discussions of what one should make of this mix of stability, movements, and error and what one 
should do about it when using the CMP data to analyze substantively important questions about 
politics and policy.  Of particular importance are our recommendation to be ever mindful of the 
two possible sources of error—a faulty instrument and erratic behavior on the part of parties 
themselves—and our suggestion for how to separate or combine those possibilities depending on 
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The left-right and other policy locations of political parties provide essential information for 
analyzing and evaluating the democratic process.  Unless parties offer identifiable positions 
distinct from one another, it is difficult to imagine how voters can use elections to influence public 
policy.  And, while popular influence comes through routes other than elections, it is more so 
through elections than through any other mechanism of popular communication that democracy 
makes good on its promises of equality and inclusiveness in popular decision making. 
Motivated by this and similar reasoning, political scientists have put substantial effort into 
identifying the ideological and policy positions of parties.  High quality expert surveys have been 
used to identify party ideological and policy locations (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 
1992; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Ray 1999).  As well, the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) 
has enlisted specialists in over 50 countries to content analyze party manifestos for the purpose of 
placing parties along specific policy dimensions and along a more general left-right dimension 
(see, e.g., Budge et al. 2001; Volkens 2001). There is also a promising program underway to create 
a computer-based content analysis of party manifestos and other documents (see Laver and Garry, 
2000; Laver, Benoit, and Garry n.d.).   One product of all this work is a fairly well established 
consensus on where parties are generally located, most particularly along a left-right dimension.   
An important question remains.  How can we observe the dynamics of party positions?  
Over a decade, the changes in party locations identified by expert surveys are minimal.  If party 
positions have changed, the almost static measurements by the existing expert surveys cannot 
indicate by how much.  The CMP data do allow for observing movement but may fall prey to 
another problem.  With each new election there is a new manifesto and consequently new content 
analysis.  The CMP records such large movements for individual parties that one wonders whether 
its record of movements is more a matter of noise than real change. 
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Our purpose is to establish a framework that provides for reliable observation of party 
dynamics along the left-right dimension.  In the next section we survey the problems one 
encounters when attempting to take account of the dynamics of party positioning.  The existing 
evidence points decidedly in the direction of saying that the CMP is the most plausible source of 
information for observing changes in party position taking.  In the second section, then, we 
investigate the dynamics of party left-right positions as revealed by the CMP data over the post-
War period.  This analysis indicates that one third of the parties show systematic changes in their 
positions.  The third section leans on the findings in section two and constructs two approaches for 
reliable measurements of party left-right positions, one based on Jerry Hausman’s regression 
strategy for identifying and dealing with measurement error (Hausman 1978) and a second based 
on a moving average strategy.  We estimate that between 19 and 20% of the CMP variance is error 
variance.  We conclude with a discussion of two important considerations: (1) whether the source 
of the error is attributable to the erratic behavior of parties or faulty measurement instruments, and 
(2) how to use the CMP data to locate parties’ left-right positions through time in a reliable and 
valid way. 
 
Problems when Measuring Party Position Dynamics 
A fairly well established body of literature has developed that tells us about the left-right 
positions of parties.  For many years, students of comparative politics used the relationship 
between parties and societal cleavages to classify parties by type (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) or 
family (Mair and Mudde 1998), and those classifications have proved to be empirically useful 
(e.g., Cameron 1978; Cusack 1997; Rueda and Pontusson 2000).  There are downsides to 
classification categories, however.  One is that the categories are admittedly rough indicators of 
party left-right positions, painting all the parties within a type or family in the same color.  Another 
is that the classifications are static.   
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One way to refine the categorizations has been to survey country experts and ask them to 
place parties along a left-right (Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995) or other policy 
dimension (Laver and Hunt 1992).  Expert surveys have refined the distinctions between parties 
that share a familial lineage, so that, for instance, German and Norwegian social democratic family 
members are not treated as the same.  As for the question of party dynamics, given that expert 
surveys have been conducted at different times, there seemed to be the possibility that the locations 
assigned at those different times could be used to gauge party policy dynamics (Knutsen 1998).  
However, it now appears that, aside from a modest degree of measurement error in the expert 
scoring, the surveys place the parties in essentially the same left-right positions through time, as if 
all party locations were completely stable (McDonald and Mendes 2001, 100).   
The problems created by static measurements of party positions come to the fore when 
expert survey data are used to investigate such issues as the role that policy positioning by parties 
plays in government formation.  In their study of coalition governments, Wolfgang Müller, Kaare 
Strøm, and their colleagues explicitly assume that the mean left-right party positions, based on a 
subset of Laver-Hunt policy placements, are “invariant over time” (Müller and Strøm 2000, 9).  
Using that assumption, they identify outcomes such as the median party in parliaments throughout 
the post-War period, with full knowledge and forthright acknowledgement that the assumption will 
generally but not always serve them well.  In his study of democratic elections, G. Bingham 
Powell, at least by implication, also uses those fixed positions to calculate left-right positions of 
governments at different times (Powell 2000, 169).1   
An alternative to the expert survey data is party position data derived from the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP).  Matthew Gabel and John Huber (2000) have shown that 
their factor analytic measure of left-right positions using the CMP data provides a reasonable 
match to expert and mass survey positioning of parties. McDonald and Mendes (2001) reported 
                                                     
1 Powell (2000, 273) was careful to use the Castles and Mair (1984) data for 1977-87 governments and the 
Huber and Inglehart (1995) data for 1988-98 governments.  However, these two expert surveys appear to 
have located the parties at essentially the same positions except for measurement error (McDonald and 
Mendes 2001, 100).  The positions assigned by the two sets of experts are thus essentially fixed across time. 
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that the CMP disagrees with expert placements for a handful of parties but otherwise the average 
CMP left-right scores in the latter years of the twentieth century place parties in essentially the 
same left-right positions that experts have reported in the three surveys previously cited.  Briefly 
stated, the CMP data can be used as valid measures of party left-right position taking, at least to 
the extent that expert and mass surveys have tapped the left-right positions of the parties. 
Since the CMP data are available for Western-democratic party systems over the post-war 
period, they may offer a tractable way to analyze party dynamics.  Over a decade, about 20 percent 
of the reliable variation in parties’ left-right positions as scored by the CMP appears due to a 
systematic substantive shift in party positions (McDonald and Mendes 2001, 106-7).  Thus 80 
percent of the reliable variation records stable differences across parties, and 20 percent of the 
reliable variation is the result of parties changing their positions in patterned ways.  But, the 80 to 
20 split of stable and change variation are percentages of the reliable variation.  How much of the 
total variation itself is reliable? 
Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson employed the CMP data to 
indicate the liberal-conservative positions of the two major American parties (Erikson, MacKuen, 
and Stimson 2002).  They suspected noise in the data and thus found it more plausible to estimate 
party positions as a series of weighted moving averages rather than to take at face value the 
position of each party as given by the CMP (see also Stimson, n.d.).  More generally, when 
HeeMin Kim and Richard Fording used the CMP data to locate the positions of median voters, 
through time in 25 different countries, their results lead implicitly to concerns about potential noise 
in the CMP data (Kim and Fording 1998; 2001).   
To calculate annual values, Kim and Fording found it convenient to assume that median 
voter positions within a nation change slowly.  Armed with that assumption, they used a linear 
interpolation from one election year to the next as the reasonable estimate of a median voter’s 
position between elections (Kim and Fording 1998, 80). 
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Assuming slow movement of median voter positions seems eminently plausible.  It 
implies that once the median voter has moved to the right, say, the median voter position at the 
next election is more likely to be located in the vicinity of that rightward position than it is to be 
located just anywhere in the left-right space.  In short, slow movements mean there is a degree of 
predictability from one election to the next.  Unfortunately, Kim and Fording’s own results do not 
square especially well with their assumption.   
We have estimated a set of autoregressive equations, one per country, for the across-time 
median voter positions during the period of the early 1950s through 1995 in each of the 17 nations 
that we will be investigating below.2  With slow movements implying predictability of median 
voter positions from one election and the next, one expects that the slope of an autoregressive 
equation will be statistically significant.  This is not the case.  For only two of the 17 countries 
(Italy and Australia) is that slope statistically significant (p < .05, one tail test); in the 15 other 
countries there is not a reliable relationship between the position where a country’s median voter is 
located in a current election and where it was located at its previous election.   
Arguably the lack of predictability could be due to very small variances, which make the 
mean as good a predictor as almost anything else.  That is not the problem, however.  Italy, one of 
the two nations for which there is a statistically significant relationship, is the nation with the 
smallest variance in the Kim-Fording location of median voters.  The general problem, we suspect, 
is that there is too much noise in the CMP party positions.   
The Dutch case helps to illustrate the reasonableness of this suspicion.  It is generally 
accepted that from a center-right position in the 1950s the Dutch electorate moved leftward in the 
                                                     
2 When examining the Kim-Fording calculations to assure their accuracy for our purposes in relation to 
another project, we reasoned that it was necessary to make one adjustment.  When the farthest left or farthest 
right party in a system is involved in the formula, Kim and Fording allow the CMP’s logically extreme 
scores of –100 or +100 to mark the endpoint where voters of that party are located.  We find this 
implausible, and we find its effect on the calculation undesirable.  In particular, –100 and +100 endpoints 
artificially stretch the distribution of voters around a party’s position.  Therefore, rather than assume a 
party’s voters are so widely dispersed, we assume they are distributed in a symmetrical interval around the 
party’s position.  For example, for a leftmost party at –15 and a 0 midpoint between it and an adjacent party 
on the right, we assume the left boundary of that party’s voters is –30.  We use our recalculated Kim-Fording 
   
                      Dynamics of Left-Right Party Positions               6 
 
 
1960s and for most of the 1970s, and thereafter, from the early 1980s into the 1990s, it showed a 
tendency to move rightward.  Surely we would want the Kim and Fording measure to indicate 
those movements.  We see in Figure 1 that they do in terms of the general contours.  However, 
there is enough of a non-smooth, saw tooth pattern in the median voter series that the predictability 
from one election to the next is unreliable at conventional levels of statistical significance. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
An obvious consequence of unreliable measurement is to create uncertainty.  When, for 
example, one tries to identify the party of the median parliamentarian using the CMP data and 
those data are less than wholly reliable, there will be uncertainty about the identification (see, e.g., 
Budge and Laver 1992, 427-28).  Further, when one uses CMP-derived measures of median voter 
and government locations as independent variables—e.g., as causal forces for explaining policy 
adoptions—and, again, those data are less than wholly reliable, then the estimated effects will be 
unreliable and biased downward (i.e., they will understate the true causal impact).  What we want, 
of course, are reliable cross-time measurements of party positions. 
 
Party Positions and Their Dynamics 
Party Positions 
We investigate the left-right locations of 81 parties in 17 Western nations.  All data are 
taken from the CMP98 data set (Budge et al. 2001).  The left-right scoring is the one developed by 
Michael Laver and Ian Budge (1992) and later adopted by the CMP.  A party’s left-right position 
is constructed by summing party emphases on 13 right-item policy categories and then subtracting 
the sum of party emphases on 13 left-item policy categories (Budge et al. 2001, 22).  The 
Appendix below provides a listing of parties and associated descriptive statistics.    Except as 
noted for two Danish parties and with allowance for the special circumstances of Belgium, France, 
Italy, and the Netherlands described below, the 81 parties include those for which we have data on 
                                                                                                                                                                
scores in the analysis reported here.  Our recalculations cover the period from a country’s first election in the 
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coded manifestos in consecutive elections totaling more than half of a nation’s elections from the 
late 1940s through 1998.3  The Belgian parties split along the lines of language during the period 
1968-77, and we treat the pre- and post-splits as separate party systems.  Parties during France’s 
Fifth Republic, but not during the Fourth Republic, are included.  The analysis of Italian parties 
stops in 1992 after which many of the Italian parties reconfigured.  Finally, the three separate 
Christian parties in the Netherlands combined at the time of the 1977 Dutch election to form the 
CDA; the three parties and the CDA are treated as four separate parties. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of party positions as scored, on average, by the CMP.  Each 
party is located according to its mean position on the CMP left-right score calculated over all 
elections of the post-war period.  This is a way of using the CMP data that assumes party left-right 
positions are static.  The figure also provides a perspective on the distinctiveness of party positions 
within each party system.  Shaded and boxed parties have positions that, while numerically 
distinguishable in their mean values, are not reliably distinguishable given their over-time 
variation.  As a summary statement of distinctiveness, the R2 values in the right-most column 
indicate how much of a party system’s total variation for its parties on the left-right dimension is 
between parties, as opposed to how much is within-party variation across-time.  From top to 
bottom, the nations are ordered according to the number of distinct party clusters (Denmark has 5, 
Sweden and Norway 4, … Italy 2) and secondarily by their R2’s. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The first issue is whether such a static representation as portrayed by the mean values, in the 
face of the over-time variation of each party’s position, is a reliable characterization.  It is not.  
                                                                                                                                                                
1950s through elections in 1995. 
3 Some of the manifesto data in CMP98 are estimated, based on a party’s manifesto at an earlier election.  
Such carryover data present problems for the analyses reported below.  Two undesirable effects are that 
variance is artificially reduced and autocorrelation is artificially created.  Therefore, we exclude carryover 
manifestos.  The exclusion is usually for one election at the beginning or end of a party’s series. The single 
election exclusions are the Belgian PVV in 1995, the Belgian FDF in 1965, the Belgian VU in 1958, the 
Canadian SC in 1972 and 1974, all Danish parties in 1998, all Norwegian parties in 1997, and the Swiss 
SVP in 1947.  Dropping the 1998 Danish data caused observations on the Danish CD and KF to go from 11 
of 22 (half) to 10 of 21 (less than half).  Still, we decided to keep both Danish parties in the analyses.  In the 
case of the French Conservatives, the entire series had to be excluded because several of its manifestos are 
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Regressing the observed positions onto the party mean values reveals a slope of 1.0, as required by 
definition.  The R2, however, is only .649.  That means that only about two-thirds of the systematic 
variance in the data is coming from differences in means across parties.  The remaining one-third 
is either noise or real movements in party positions.  If the movements are all or mostly noise, then 
the CMP is a not very reliable statement (so far as we can tell from both expert surveys and the 
CMP means) of static party position taking.  If it reflects all or mostly real party dynamics, then 
static portrayals of party positions are not in that case valid statements of where parties stand 
across time on the left-right dimension.  We turn now to an investigation of party dynamics. 
 
Party Left-Right Dynamics 
We need to assess whether evidence of systematic change in party positioning exists.  We 
make the assessment by estimating an autoregressive equation on each party’s series of positions.  
Party positions that shift over the long run, such as those forming a trend, will result in an 
autoregressive equation that indicates a party’s long-run expected value (a sort of dynamic mean) 
is different from its mean as reported in Figure 2 above.4  A party that changes by drifting away 
from its mean position for a sustained period but later coming back to it, a characteristic of cyclical 
movements, will result in an autoregressive equation with patterned change that leaves the long-
run expected value and the mean close to one another.  Finally, results from an autoregressive 
equation that indicate the mean is a reasonable description regardless of a party’s position at the 
previous election are situations where parties are moving as-if randomly around their respective 
mean positions, neither trending nor drifting. 
                                                                                                                                                                
recorded as estimates.  Finally, the manifesto of the United Socialists in Italy for the 1968 election is the 
1968 score that we assign individually and separately to the PSI and PSDI.  
4 As we explain immediately below, the dynamic mean is distinguishable from a commonly-referred to mean 
by estimating an autoregressive equation and seeing whether the slope is zero.  If the slope is zero, then the 
mean value of Y at any given time is estimated to be equal to the autoregressive intercept; if the slope is 
different from zero, then the mean, which is estimated to vary, is estimated by the intercept divided by one 
minus the slope.  For excellent discussions of substantive interpretations of autoregressive equations in the 
context of politics, see Spafford (1971) and Price and Sanders (1993).   
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 To describe in more detail how the autoregressive equation can be used to identify what we 
label as changers, drifters, and homeostatic wanderers, we start with the equation as applied to any 
one party’s left-right position.  It takes this form: 
LRt  =   α  +  β LRt-1 +  εt . 
where LRt is a party’s left-right position for the current election; LRt-1 is that party’s left right 
position at the previous election; α is the intercept; β is the slope; and εt is (assumed to be) a set of 
well behaved (homoscedastic and nonautocorrelated) errors in party positions at the current 
elections.  When the estimated value of β is not distinguishable from zero, it indicates that the 
movements around the party left-right mean are, so far as we can tell, random deviations from 
which a party can be expected to return to its typical (mean) position at the next election.  When β 
is distinguishable from zero and in the interval –1 to +1 (all of our estimates are in that interval), 
party movements show signs of sustained changes through time.  For example, a statistically 
significant slope of .75 indicates that a deviation from the party’s long-run typical left-right 
position is expected to move toward (but not to) that position at the next election.  The speed at 
which it approaches that long-run typical position is (1 – β).  In the case of the example (1 – β) is 1 
− .75, or .25; therefore that party is expected to move one-quarter of the way from where it was at 
the last election toward where it is expected to be in the long run.  The difference between where 
we can expect a party to be in the long run and where it is on average (as in Figure 2) is one way to 
describe how and by how much the party has changed.  To estimate where a party’s left-right 
position will be in the long run, all that is needed is to divide the intercept by the value of one 
minus the slope—i.e., [α / (1 – β)] (see Spafford 1971; Price and Sanders 1993). 
As we shall see, there are parties for which the slope is distinguishable from zero and the 
difference between the mean and the party’s long-run expected position is large.  We call these 
parties changers.  There are also instances of parties with slopes distinguishable from zero but with 
small differences between each one’s mean value versus its long-run expected value.  These are 
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parties that drifted one way, then the other—going through cycles of reliably predictable and 
moderately sustained movements.  We call these parties drifters.  Finally, there are parties that 
diverge from and converge toward their mean values in an essentially unpredictable manner.  For 
these parties, their movements away from their mean positions are expected to be short-lived, with 
an expectation of each one returning to its mean position at the next election.  We call these parties 
homeostatic wanderers.   
For a party with patterns of change that show a shift to a new position, as would be true for 
a party whose positions form a trend, we have said there is a large difference between its mean 
left-right position and its long-run expected left-right position.  Figure 3 is a histogram that 
displays these differences for each of the 81 parties.  The slope, intercept, mean, and long-run 
expected value for each party are provided in the Appendix.  Not many parties show much 
difference.  Only 10 of the 81 parties (12.3%) have expected long-run positions that differ from 
their respective mean positions by more than +4 points.  Two of those 10 parties—the Dutch CDA 
and Italy’s PSI—show changes larger than +4, but their changes are based on estimated slopes that 
we deem to be unreliable.5  That leaves eight parties that have changed their left-right positions 
through time in a reliably estimated manner; these eight are our so-called changers. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
                                                     
5 We take what could be considered a liberal approach to a decision rule for reliably estimated relationships, 
but what we have done in fact is to take account of the effect of measurement error.  Errors in an X variable 
reduce the magnitude of an estimated slope, and errors in both the X and Y variables are likely to increase the 
slope’s standard error.  Given that a t-ratio is (b / sb), the effect of measurement errors makes tests of 
statistical significance at conventional levels (e.g., p < .05) prone to Type II errors.  Therefore, we loosen the 
conventional standard of, say,  p < .05 so that reliably predicted behavior is deemed to exist when a slope’s  
t-value has a magnitude such that t < –1.5 or t > 1.5.  For readers who wish to use a different standard, the 
slopes and standard errors are reported in the Appendix.  Twenty-one parties show a statistically significant 
relationship at conventional levels, compared to 27 using our looser 1.5 t-value.  Note that the liberal 
decision rule has no effect on our subsequent analyses and evaluations, except to cause us to provide detailed 
descriptions of change for 27 instead of 21 parties in Tables 1 and 2. 
      Tests of statistical significance could also be affected by autocorrelated errors.  We have checked for 
autocorrelation for each of the 81 party series.  When a lagged value of Y is on the right hand side, the test 
(e.g., Durbin’s h) is a large sample test and is not especially powerful.  With our small samples of between 6 
and 21 elections for any one party, about half of the tests are not calculable.  However, we can and have 
calculated values of rho for all parties (see the Appendix).  We find an estimated rho between + .25 for 72 of 
the 81 parties.  Therefore, in no more than few cases could it be said that a concern about autocorrelation is 
warranted. 
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The eight changers are listed in Table 1.  There, too, we provide a description of the 
pattern of change along with each party’s mean value over the period, its so-called target position 
(which is where, based on our analysis, we expect the party left-right position to settle over the 
long run), and its left-right position by decade.  The first thing to notice is that of the eight 
changers four no longer existed in the same organizational form in the late 1990s.  Two Italian 
parties, the PSDI and PRI, each of which had been moving to the right, were themselves 
transformed when the party system as a whole changed after the 1992 election.  In addition, two 
other changers are Dutch Christian parties—ARP and CHU—that combined, also with the 
Catholic KVP, to form the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) in the 1970s.  The movements of 
both Dutch (Protestant) Christian parties show a trend leftward, and after they merged into the 
CDA they held a center-left position (see the CDA mean in Figure 2).   That leaves four parties 
that have different left-right positions in the 1990s compared to where they stood in, say, 1960.  
Patterns of change for these four are consistent with what informed observers of these parties tell 
us was happening throughout the period.  The Austrian FPÖ is reported to have placed itself to the 
left during the 1960s in order to gain favor with the SPÖ for government coalition bargaining 
purposes, then gave up that strategy and moved strongly to the right (Müller 2000, 87).    Mair 
(1986) reports that Fine Gael took noticeable steps to the left during the 1960s and 1970s and 
stood clearly to the left of Fianna Fáil during that time.  Hanne Marthe Narud and Kaare Strøm 
said of the leftward drift of Norway’s SP that “the party’s opposition to European integration has 
gradually generalized into a greater skepticism towards market economies” (Narud and Strøm 
2000, 164).  Finally, the Democrats in the United States, most especially under the leadership of 
President Clinton but presaged by smaller movements toward the center during the 1980s, is 
generally understood to have moved to the center (see, e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 
2002).   
[Table 1 about here] 
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 Nineteen parties are classified as drifters, more than twice the number of changers.  The 
drifters are listed in Table 2.  Recall that our classification criterion for drifters versus changers is 
that, while a drifter’s position undergoes predictable and sustained changes, in the long run its left-
right position is not much different from its mean position over the entire period.  This is reflected 
in the column in the middle of the table, where the mean and (long-run) target values are reported.  
One general pattern of drift covers the Anglo-American parties.  In Australia, New Zealand, UK, 
and U.S., the drifters each moved toward the right, a movement that also describes the U.S. 
Democrats in Table 1.  The reason many of these appear to be drifters rather than changers is that 
along the way their movements were erratic enough as not to provide a firm basis for describing 
them as trends.  Among the drifters in Belgium (if we were to add in the combined liberals of the 
1950s and 1960s), the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, the movements follow a pattern where 
the 1960s and 1970s show leftward shift followed by rightward shifts during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Four other parties did not head toward the right side of the spectrum during the 1980s and 1990s—
the Irish FF, Danish CD and KrF, and the Swiss CVP.  Fianna Fáil moved rightward in the 1960s 
and 1970s only to move leftward toward the center in the 1980s and 1990s.  The two Danish 
parties , CD and KrF, started on the right, both having won seats for the first time in the time of the 
traumatic 1973 Danish election, and tended to move slightly leftward toward a center-right 
position. The Swiss CVP appears to have moved erratically but decidedly to the left over the entire 
period. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 The modal outcome is that of the homeostatic wanderers.  There are 54 of them, 66.7% of 
all the parties analyzed (their results from our autoregressive estimations can be seen in the 
Appendix).  These are parties that, as the wandering portion of their label suggests, have moved 
around without developing patterns of sustained change across time.  We say of them, then, that, 
so far as we can tell from the autoregressive estimations, their movements are as-if random.  Of 
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course, the “homeostatic” qualifier in the label indicates that a party’s wandering is anchored in a 
meaningful position, presumably to their leaders as well to voters. 
 It is proper to ask whether the wandering is untethered or homeostatic.  A set of completely 
random numbers will have a mean; hence having a mean can hardly be a justification for inferring 
that these parties have an identifiable ideological home.  The inference of homeostasis will have to 
rest on how widely these parties wander away from their respective mean positions.  The standard 
deviations around the mean positions of homeostatic wanderers are actually slightly smaller on 
average than the standard deviations around the regression lines of the changers and the drifters.  
Among the 54 homeostatic wanderers, the average standard deviation is 12.4; for the changers and 
drifters, the average standard deviation around their regression lines (average se values) is 13.4.  In 
that sense, the unpredictable variation of the homeostatic wanderers based on their means is 
slightly less than the unpredictable variation based on the otherwise predictable movements of the 
changers and drifters.  In short, a mean position of a homeostatic wanderer generally characterizes 
its positions as well as a regression equation characterizes a position of a changer or drifter. 
 
Constructing Reliable Measurements of Dynamic Party Positions 
The evidence indicates that one third of our observed parties changed their left-right 
positions in systematic ways.  It also indicates that around our best estimate of a party’s position 
through time there is, by definition of the autoregressive equation, something on the order of 13 
standard deviation units of error.  Given the systematic change, it is necessary to try to capture the 
dynamic aspects of party positioning; given the estimated error, it is desirable to try to rid the 
measurements of their noise.   
 
Hausman Approach 
Hausman’s approach to measurement error offers a promising avenue for improving 
reliability of the CMP measurements while retaining the party dynamics.  Hausman reasons that 
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predicted values (Y-hats) from regression analysis provide a statement of an outcome without the 
measurement noise, because the noise of the measurements is relegated to the error term of the 
equation (Hausman 1978; see also Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991, 160-62; Johnston and DiNardo 
1997, 153-56).  In the context of our autoregressive equations, the matter is slightly more 
complicated and therefore requires an adjustment.  Our dynamic estimates place the supposedly 
somewhat noisy measure on the left-hand side and on the right-hand side.   We do not so much 
want to employ the estimated dynamics of the process to predict a party’s position in a next 
election from what it was in the previous election as we want to use those estimated dynamics to 
smooth the errors in the measurements as such.  For each of our 81 parties, therefore, we create a 
set of smoothed estimates by applying the dynamics estimated from the autoregressive equation to 
a party’s current election CMP score.  These are approximations of what the party positions would 
look like were it not for the noise in the measurements.   
Figure 4 offers an intuitive sense and visual depiction of how the smoothing of measurement 
error and retention of party dynamics operate.  The left graph, Figure 4a, shows the time sequence 
development of both the observed and predicted values of Austrian FPÖ’s left-right positions.  The 
CMP observed scores and the predicted (smoothed) values both track the slightly leftward and then 
strongly rightward movement of the FPÖ (see Müller 2000, 87).  Lest one think that applying the 
estimated dynamics to the CMP scores does hardly anything more than reproduce the CMP values 
themselves, as they very nearly do for the FPÖ, the graph on the right, Figure 4b, shows the 
predicted values for the Norwegian DNA.  The DNA is one of the parties we labeled as a 
homeostatic wanderer.  With respect to it, we estimated virtually no predictable dynamic 
movement in left-right position-taking (see the DNA equation reported in the Appendix), and, 
thus, the smoothed values track through time a steady left position, with, by implication, the 
variation around it being something we could reasonably consider to be error.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
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Considered over all the parties, the association between the predicted values generated by 
applying the estimated dynamics in order to smooth the CMP data and the observed CMP data has 
an R2 of .806.  This is a reliability estimate for the data.  Eighty to 81 percent of the observed 
variance is reliable; the balance, 19 to 20 percent, is error variance.  We can go one step further.  
Over all 81 parties, we earlier reported an estimated R2 of .649 for association between the mean 
and the observed data.  In summary, therefore, we can say that 64.9 percent of the variance in the 
CMP data records stable differences across party positions, 15.7 percent records change, and 19.4 
percent records error.  By implication, 19.5 percent of the reliable variation throughout the post-
war period is reliable dynamic variation (i.e., [.157/.806] x 100).   
 
Moving Average Approach 
The Hausman approach carries us a long way by providing a solid sense of the stability, 
dynamics, and error in measuring party positions via the CMP.  There is something costly about 
this approach, however, and there is something else theoretically unappealing, at least intuitively.  
The approach is costly in the sense that it only applies to parties for which we have a long enough 
series to estimate whether the party has developed a systematic dynamic.  The approach is 
theoretically unappealing in the intuitive sense that with each new data point added to a party’s 
series we are liable to have to change our view of where the party stood at each other election.  Re-
estimation of British Labour’s left-right position in the aftermath of Tony Blair’s selection as 
leader, for instance, will change the coefficients of the autoregressive equation and thereby create 
different statements of where Labour was located in, say, 1974.  To confront these concerns, our 
strategy is to (1) accept the Hausman-based estimates as good, (2) create a less costly and more 
theoretically appealing alternative, and (3) judge the quality of the alternative by how well it 
matches the Hausman-based estimates.   
 An alternative that we find to be a reasonable approximation is a three-election moving 
average of observed CMP scores, where the average is taken to be an estimate of a party’s position 
for the middle election of the three.  The purpose of centering the average on the middle election is 
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that for parties changing in a systematic way centering the average on the middle election stays 
true to the timing of the movement.6   
 The relationship between the Hausman-style scoring and the moving average is, 
L-Rit MA3 = -.32 + 1.01 LRit Hausman,     with R2 = .896; se = 6.80. 
                                              (.23)   (.01) 
 
L-Rit MA3 is the three-election moving average for party i at time t; LRit Hausman is the left-right 
Hausman-based score for the same party at the same election.  If the noise in the Hausman-based 
measure is essentially zero, then the reliability of the moving average is .896.  This means the 
moving average cuts in half the unreliability of the observed CMP scores.  We discuss below the 
issue of on what basis the moving average could be judged to be as good as the Hausman-based 
measurements; for now, however, we can say that a 90 percent reliability figure as a tradeoff to the 
practical difficulties of the Hausman approach seems to us reasonable. 
 Finally, we can consider what effect the moving-average measurements have on estimating 
positions of median voters.  Earlier we reported that using the election-by-election observed CMP 
scores under the Kim-Fording approach to locating median voters, there was not much 
predictability of a country’s median voter’s position from one election to the next.  In only two of 
the 17 countries that we have been analyzing are there statistically significant relationships 
between a median voter’s position in a current election and the previous election.  Using the three-
election moving average, 14 of the 17 countries show a statistically significant relationship—
Denmark, Germany, and France are the exceptions.  This is not a test of the veracity of the 
moving-average measurements, inasmuch as we adopted the moving-average approach with 
                                                     
6 An initial reaction of several colleagues has been that it would be more appropriate to score the moving 
average for the current election as the CMP scores from the two preceding elections and the current election 
(i.e., t–2, t–1 , and t), rather than from the preceding, current, and next election (i.e., t–1, t, and t+1).  We 
disagree, and once we explained why the colleagues conceded the point.  The problem with using an average 
from elections at t-2, t-1 and t is that it systematically understates the position of a party that is changing.  
For instance, imagine that a party moves from a center-left position to a decidedly right position over five 
elections in the 1980s and 1990s in a sequence of left-right scores, such as –6, 0, 6, 12, and 18.  A moving 
average for the t3 score based on the two preceding elections and election and t3 would have an average of 0, 
and at t4 the average is 6.  In effect, calculating the moving average in that way knowingly lags one election 
behind the observed positions. 
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foreknowledge that it would address the counter-theoretical finding of unstable median voter 
positions.  Rather, the 14 of 17 statistically significant relationships show the moving average 
measurements by and large do resolve the empirical and theoretical mismatch, as was intended.   
 
Discussion and Evaluation 
There is a systematic dynamic in some parties’ position taking.  It also needs to be said that 
there is also a good deal of stability in party positions.  Third, taking the CMP at face value, there 
is a sizable proportion of noise.  What is one to make of all of this?  And what is one to do about 
it? 
 What one makes of the stability, change, and noise in measured party positions and what 
one does about it depends on the theoretical concern and empirical conditions of a particular 
investigation.  Data are to be selected consistent with a theoretical concept at hand.  Trite as this 
may sound, it appears to us to be much less than self-evident.  Take as an example the proposition 
that expert survey data are better than CMP data or vice versa.  Such a claim is disconnected with 
any theoretical concern.  It is not so much that one is good and the other bad, or one is good but the 
other better.  Such claims are standard-less.  Rather, one set of data is more and another less 
consistent with a theoretically anchored investigation. 
 Concerning parties, some theoretical interests reside with the ideological standing of parties 
with respect to their longstanding core principles.  This, we surmise, is what gives rise to the 
results found in expert surveys; that is, the experts (on average, across the several experts from 
each country) are recording the longstanding core principle positions of parties.  In the case of the 
CMP data, measuring the concept of longstanding core ideological party principles might best be 
approximated by mean values across one or two decades.  Thus, for instance, if one wanted to 
investigate whether a party’s ideological position predicts particular policy stands among its 
adherents—say, for a member of the European Parliament who sits among one of the transnational 
parliamentary party groupings somewhat detached from the daily twists and turns of domestic 
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political debates or for a member of the mass public who is likely to have a general, not specific, 
idea of his or her preferred party’s position taking (Pierce 1999)—it would be wise to use party 
locations measured as longstanding core principle as the indicator of a national party’s ideological 
position.  For theoretical concerns that involve party and partisan activity closer to home and in the 
sometimes strategic maneuvering of electoral politics (Budge 1994; Adams 2001), however, taking 
account of the shorter run dynamics will usually have importance. 
 Taking account of the shorter run dynamics poses an especially important and interesting 
question about the sources of measurement error.  The label “measurement error” tends to make 
one think first of a faulty instrument, but that is not necessarily the inference one should draw.  
When Philip Converse originally estimated and later elaborated on his thesis of non-attitudes 
among the American mass public, he did so by estimating the degrees of measurement error in 
mass attitudes (Converse 1964; 1970; Converse and Markus 1979).  Having found a good deal of 
measurement error, Converse’s inference indicted the public’s unstable attitudes as the source of 
the error.  It was not until a decade later that Chris Achen pointed a finger at the survey 
instruments as a source of the error (Achen 1975; see also Pierce and Rose 1974; for a discussion 
of this issue and a third interpretation see Erikson 1979, especially 90-91 and 110). 
 The inferential difficulty, when trying to decide between attributions to a faulty instrument 
versus to erratic behavior as the source of error, arises because using a test-retest analysis to model 
measurement error, as Converse had done and as we have done here, requires one to have in mind 
a model of ‘true behavioral change’ in order to be able to separate noise in the measurements from 
change in the behavior (Heise 1969).  Typically, the implicit model of “true” behavior change is a 
Markovian process.  This is the model implicit in the interpretations we put to our autoregressive 
equations.  In effect, the assumption says that when behavior truly changes it does so 
systematically (i.e., in predictable ways).  It then adds by implication that to the extent behavior is 
not predictable the remaining portion of the measured signal is noise.   
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 Taking account of the dual possibilities that measurement error may be attributable to faulty 
readings of totally solid behavior but, alternatively, may be attributable to accurate readings of 
somewhat erratic behavior, it is interesting to ask which possibility is a more plausible 
interpretation of the CMP record of party left-right positions.  Few will doubt that noise comes into 
the CMP scores from the loose way in which words are used, misinterpretations by a coder of a 
manifesto, the exclusive reliance on 26 left-right CMP categories and exclusion of the 30 others, 
coding transcription errors, and input errors (see Volkens 2001).  But few will also doubt that party 
positions sometimes change in erratic ways.  Seldom does one find characterizations of parties as 
totally solid, dependable, and (if one will) reliable political actors.  More typical are 
characterizations that a party “cannot be defined in terms of its principles” (Schumpeter 1942, 
283), is “ever hungry for new members” (Michels 1949, 374), is motivated by a specific goal of 
maximizing votes (Downs 1957, 30), and engages in political strategy that “appears to center on 
finding out what the public wants to hear and marketing the product accordingly” (Farrell and 
Webb 2000, 122). 
  We cannot know for sure at this time how much of party position taking noise is coming 
from faults in the measurement process and how much resides with the behavioral manifestation of 
erratic party wavering in a manifesto.  We strongly suspect, however, that the matter is not a 
wholly either/or proposition; the truth probably lies somewhere in-between.  For that reason, we 
are inclined to advise analysts that if they have to choose one procedure for measuring party 
positions when recordable dynamics in policy positions hold theoretical importance, the preferred 
method is the three-election moving average.  For example, in applications that seek to (1) 
estimate ideological positions of governments from weighted averages of party positions, or  (2) 
calculate median voter positions, or (3) identify a parliamentary median we suggest, the moving 
average is, at this time, the preferred measurement.  They stay true to the central tendencies of the 
party positions, capture the dynamics of parties that are changing in systematic ways, and handoff 
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about half of the observed noise to measurement error as if it were an instrument problem but 
retain the other half of the error as a record of the wavering position taking of parties.   
Finally, we would advise analysts to remain self-consciously aware of the measurement 
error and its two possible sources, for in certain types of analyses it will be feasible to incorporate 
two or more measurement possibilities.  If, for example, one is estimating the effect of policy 
position taking of governing parties on policy adoptions, the party position measured by a moving-
average and by observed CMP scores can both be included as independent variables.  Michael 
McDonald, Ian Budge, and Richard Hofferbert (1999) did something similar.  They investigated 
policy position-taking by U.S. presidents over the post-war period by estimating whether both 
longstanding core party principles, measured as a party’s post-war left-right mean, and shorter run 
election-to-election party position taking, both independently affected policy stands of Democratic 
and Republican presidents.  Their analysis showed that each did have an independent effect.  Thus, 
with election-to-election CMP scores showing an effect over and above the effect estimated from 
the average party positions, there is evidence that the seemingly erratic left-right movements by 
the parties are something more than noise from a faulty instrument.  Those movements have 
observable consequences.  Noise, by definition, bears no relationship to anything.  When the 
substantive question at hand would be informed by estimating a two- or threefold mix of 
longstanding core principle, systematic change, and election-to-election (seemingly) erratic 
movements, and the research design permits the use of all three, researchers can, and often should, 
employ that mix. 
 
Conclusion 
Left-right positions of some parties do change and drift in discernable ways.  That makes the 
CMP data, or similar data, necessary for analyses involving party positions over an appreciable 
amount of time.  As well, however, the CMP data contain error, as much as 20 percent of all the 
observed variance.  That makes it necessary to be conscious of the error and the potential effects it 
can have on one’s inferences.  It also makes it necessary to take care to adopt the measurement 
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consistent with one’s theoretical concept and, when possible, to employ analytical strategies that 
allow one to test whether the source of the error is a noisy instrument or erratic party behavior.   
Given consciousness and care, we conclude, the CMP data offer sound opportunities to learn a 
good deal about the political and policy roles of parties. 
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  2.5           14.2 
Started center, moved left, then steadily back to center and continued 
on past center to right 








 11.1           6.5 
Started right, moved steadily to center-left until 80s, then moved to 
center-right 








-12.2         -4.5 
Started left and moved rather steadily toward and to center 
 








 -0.7         15.3 
Started left-center and moved, in step-like manner, rather steadily to 
right 








  5.0        -29.6 
Steady movement from center-right to center-left when it ended in 
early 70s 








  8.9         -3.1 
Started right, moved to center in the 60s and ended in center-left in 
the early 70s 








 -5.3       -17.3 
Started right-center, moved steadily and quickly left, reaching left-
center by mid-60s and stayed there 








-12.8       -1.9 
Started left-center into the 1980s, then moved steadily to and through 
center to center-right 
50s = -19.1     60s = -15.6    70s = -20.4     80s = -14.1    90s = +10.5 
 
 
Source: Estimations and compilations by authors based on CMP98 data (Budge et al. 2001). 
 
a A changing party takes left-right positions in a manner that change predictably from one election to the next 
and show estimated long-run left-right position away from its mean left-right position over the post-war period 
(beyond +4 points).  For details on the estimation of patterns of change and their magnitudes, see the Appendix. 
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 -11.1       -7.3 
Started left, stayed left through the 70s, drifted to varied positions at and 
around the center  








 -1.9          1.5 
Started center-left in late 60s, moved steadily to center-right in 80s, and 
moved to center 








 -2.9        -3.4 
Started center, veered to center left in late 60s, climbed back center-right 
and moved to center 








  4.2          6.2 
Center until mid-70s and drifted to right-center thereafter 
 








 21.9        21.3 
Started right (70s), stay right in 80s and moved to center in 90s 
 








 20.3        18.6 
Started right (70s), moved to center-right in 80s, and stayed 
 








  6.4           8.3 
Started center, moved right in 60s and 70s, jumped back to center in late 
70s and stayed center 








-25.0       -25.5 
Started left (60s), moved steadily left in 60s and 70s, and back toward and 
to center-left in 80s and 90s 








-18.3       -18.3 
Started left (60s), moved further left in 70s, and to center-left in 80s and 
90s 








-24.4       -24.5 
Started left, moved steadily toward center in 60s and 70s, drifted 
unsteadily back to left in mid-80s and 90s 








   0.1         -2.4 
Started center-right, drifted steadily to center-left til 90s, and jumped back 
to center 








   4.2          3.2 
Started center-right, drifted steadily toward center-left from 60 til mid-70s, 
and moved back to center-right 








-23.2       -20.6 
Started left, moving a little further left in 60s, jumped to center-left in early 
70s, drifted back left, only to move to center in 90s 








 -4.2         -6.4 
Started center-right, jumped to left in 60s, and gradually drifted back to 
center-right 








 36.9         34.9 
Started right, moved to center-right in 70s, moved back to right 
 








 -3.3         -0.7 
Started center drifting right, swung center-left in 60s and stayed until early 
80s, drifted to center-right 








 10.1          6.6 
Started right, jumped to center in mid 60s and stays center 
 








   7.9        10.5 
Started variably though slightly left,  drifted toward center-right through 
60s and 70s and to right in 80s and 90s 








 13.9        15.9 
Started erratically around center, more reliably center in late 60s and 70s, 
and moved right in 80s and 90s 
50s = +7.0    60s = +4.3      70s = +3.7     80s = +28.5    90s = +27.3  
Source: Estimations and compilations by authors based on CMP98 data (Budge et al. 2001) 
 
a A drifting party takes left-right positions in a manner that change predictably from one election to the next but 
has an estimated long-run left-right position close to its mean left-right position over the post-war period (within 
+4 points).  For details on the estimations of patterns of drift, see the Appendix. 




Figure 1: Across-time Positions of the Dutch Median Voter as Calculated 




























  MVt = -7.3 + .29 MVt-1, with R2 = .13, and se = 10.5. 
                                (3.7)  (.24)      
 
Results not statistically significant, t = 1.21 (p > .10, one-tail test). 
   




Figure 2: Contained in separate file, see PtyDynFig2.doc 
   






Figure 3:  Histogram of the Difference between a Party’s Mean and Long-run 
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a One large leftward changer (-34, Dutch ARP) is not fully depicted in this representation; it is one of the 
three in the category of < -12. 
   




Figure 4: Examples of the Correspondence between Observed and Estimated Left-Right Positions of Two Parties, One with 
       a Systematic Dynamic (Austrian FPÖ) and Another with no Systematic Dynamic (Norwegian DNA) 
 
 
Figure 4a:  Austrian FPÖ Observed and Predicted    Figure 4b: Norwegian DNA Observed & Predicted 
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             std 
 Country            Party    CMPid    N         Mean    dev           a           sa                b         sb              t            rho     Target 
 
 Australia  LAB 63320  22 -11.1 16.7  -2.79  4.44    .620  .232 2.67  .07   -7.3 
  LIB 63620  22  22.0 17.3  15.76  6.12    .336  .229 1.47  .03   23.7 
  CP 63810  22  27.2 20.5  22.20  7.56    .165  .230 0.72  .02   26.6 
 
 Austria  SPÖ 42320  15 -14.1 14.9 -13.32  7.61    .047  .379 0.12  .19  -14.0 
  FPÖ 42420  15   2.5 25.4   3.33  5.74    .766  .277 2.77  .01   14.2 
  OVP 42520  15  16.9 18.1  10.19  6.39    .367  .282    1.30  .07   16.1 
 
 Belgium     PSB/BSP 21320  11 -24.4 13.7 -36.04  8.45   -.438  .304   -1.44  .23  -25.1 
  SP 21321   6 -21.1  7.1 -19.86 11.87   -.017  .512   -0.03 -.14  -19.5 
  PS 21322   6 -13.4  8.3 -20.71  4.37   -.401  .328   -1.22 -.17  -14.8 
     PLP/PVV 21420   8  20.8 11.6  28.55  9.65   -.355  .424   -0.84  .21   21.1 
  PVV 21421   8  13.3 15.3   9.81 10.17    .349  .496 0.70  .50   15.1 
  PRL 21422   8   6.5 11.9   4.62  5.53    .419  .402 1.04  .32    8.0 
     PSC/CVP 21520   7   3.0 12.8  -2.29  2.14    .190  .419 0.45  .18   -2.8 
  CVP 21521  10  -1.9 10.1   0.49  2.45    .674  .240 2.81  .06    1.5 
  PSC 21522  10  -4.5 10.8  -1.48  3.66    .471  .316 1.49  .08   -2.8 
 FDF 21912   9  -3.7  5.0  -5.31  2.25   -.303  .369   -0.82 -.14   -4.1 
  VU 21913  12  -3.6 12.0  -2.14  3.58    .501  .286 1.75  .09   -4.3 
 
 Canada  NDP 62320  17 -33.1  9.6 -26.72  9.05    .188  .262 0.72 -.01  -32.9 
  LIB 62420  17  -2.5  9.5  -2.68  2.55    .152  .263 0.58 -.02   -3.2 
  PCP 62620  17   4.2 10.8   3.22  2.54    .477  .223 2.14 -.03    6.2 
  SC 62951   9  -1.0 16.5   1.84  6.07    .180  .374 0.48  .02    2.2 
 
 Denmark  DKP 13220  17 -31.7 12.4 -23.19  8.49    .295  .254 1.16  .00  -32.9 
  SF 13230  15 -31.8 12.4 -25.71  5.81    .110  .168 0.65  .19  -28.9 
  SD 13320  21 -16.3 11.0 -15.64  4.74    .002  .237 0.01  .04  -15.7 
  CD 13330  10  21.9 16.5   8.34  9.57    .608  .337 1.80  .22   21.3 
  RV 13410  21  -8.6  9.9  -8.40  3.06   -.018  .233   -0.08  .03   -8.3 
  VEN 13420  21  21.0 14.6  22.93  6.30   -.090  .275   -0.33  .14   21.0 
  KrF 13520  11  20.3 10.5   7.89  7.40    .575  .314 1.83  .15   18.6 
  KF 13620  21  25.9 16.4  28.17  6.86   -.036  .221   -0.16 -.04   27.2 
  FP 13951  10  28.2 14.5  34.06 11.11   -.154  .376   -0.41  .03   29.5 
  RF 13952  17  11.4 10.0  12.23  4.55   -.048  .298   -0.16  .19   11.7 
 
 France  PCF 31220  11 -36.7  9.8 -41.78  7.74   -.151  .212   -0.71 -.30  -36.3 
  PS 31320  11 -28.8 14.0 -14.92 10.65    .443  .315 1.41 -.09  -26.8 
  Gaul 31621  11  15.8 12.6  14.43  7.30    .081  .351 0.23  .07   15.7 
 
 Germany  SPD 41320  14 -15.1  9.1 -12.28  6.23    .156  .344 0.45  .21  -14.5 
  FDP 41420  14   0.4 11.3    0.61  3.14   -.365  .278   -1.31  .00    0.4 
     CDU-CDS 41521  14  10.9 18.2  12.77  5.86   -.011  .293   -0.04 -.05   12.6 
 
 Ireland  LAB 53320  16 -22.1 10.5 -21.61  7.59    .028  .303 0.09  .24  -22.2 
  FG 53520  16  11.1 26.2   3.91  6.47    .399  .227 1.76 -.06    6.5 
  FF 53620  16   6.4 22.4   5.10  5.80    .386  .249 1.55  .02    8.3 
 
 Italy  PCI 32220  12 -15.1 12.3 -16.35  8.61   -.108  .436   -0.25 -.04  -14.8 
   PSI 32320  12 -15.6 14.8  -6.15  7.21    .449  .329 1.36  .04  -11.2 
   PSDI 32330  11 -12.8 16.2  -2.08  5.28    .582  .252 2.31 -.34   -5.0 
   PRI 32410  12  -0.7 21.9   3.03  5.49    .802  .290 2.77 -.02   15.3 
   PLI 32420  12   6.4 17.2   6.72  5.76   -.141  .317   -0.44  .44    5.9 
   DC 32520  12   0.7 11.5  -1.90  2.23    .254  .198 1.28  .15   -2.5 
   MSI 32710  12   9.7 17.2   8.59  6.53    .238  .360 0.66  .03   11.3 
 
 Luxembourg     KPL 23220  11 -41.4 14.1 -32.32 15.11    .216  .345 0.63  .04  -41.2 
  LSAP 23320  12 -30.4 12.7 -27.56 10.93    .053  .324 0.16  .10  -29.1 
  DP 23420  10  -4.6 12.0  -2.36  4.67    .354  .411 0.86  .11   -3.7 













         std 
Country            Party    CMPid    N         Mean   dev           a           sa                b         sb              t            rho      Target 
 
Netherlands  PvdA 22320  16 -25.0 12.0 -12.56  6.62    .507  .238 2.13  .03  -25.5 
   D66 22330  10 -18.3 11.6  -8.57  6.98    .531  .320 1.66  .08  -18.3 
   VVD 22420  16  13.4  8.4  13.54  4.46   -.037  .277   -0.13  .00   13.1 
   CDA 22521   7  -8.5  6.3  -3.02  5.50    .515  .494 1.04  .15   -6.2 
   KVP 22522   9  -1.9 14.5  -2.48  5.62    .291  .408 0.71 -.02   -3.5 
   ARP 22523   9   5.0 14.6  -3.50  3.39    .882  .229 3.85 -.22  -29.6 
  CHU 22525   9   8.9 17.5  -0.95  6.70    .697  .348 2.00 -.26   -3.1 
 
 
New Zealand  LAB 64320  18 -24.4 11.1  -9.88  5.63    .596  .217 2.75  .07  -24.5 
  NP 64620  18   2.9 13.1   2.67  3.44    .180  .257 0.70  .08    3.3 
 SC 64951  13 -19.7 13.2 -23.33  7.40   -.190  .310   -0.61  .21  -19.6 
 
Norway  SV 12221   9 -38.8  6.6 -25.31 16.68    .337  .415 0.81  .22  -38.2 
  DNA 12320  13 -31.2  5.9 -32.99 12.66   -.060  .389   -0.15  .17  -31.1 
   VEN 12420  13 -19.1 10.6 -13.78  7.19    .286  .320 0.89  .07  -19.3 
   KF 12520  13  -0.1 13.6  -0.96  3.01    .655  .222 2.95  .15   -2.8 
       HØYRE 12620  13   3.5 12.3   1.12  3.24    .516  .267 1.93  .11    2.3 
  SP 12810  13  -4.5 17.2  -5.11  1.67    .708  .097 7.30  .65  -17.5 
 
Sweden  VP 11220  17 -41.1  5.3 -33.31 11.24    .184  .269 0.68 -.01  -40.8 
  SDP 11320  17 -23.2 19.7 -10.01  7.34    .513  .237 2.16 -.12  -20.6 
  FP 11420  17  -4.2 24.5  -3.27  5.56    .492  .226 2.18  .14   -6.4 
   MSP 11620  17  36.9 17.4  21.58  9.55    .382  .235 1.63 -.10   34.9 
   CP 11810  17  -3.3 12.3  -0.21  2.58    .706  .208 3.39  .07   -0.7 
 
Switzerland  SPS 43320  13 -20.1 13.8 -26.56  5.62   -.198  .230   -0.86 -.42  -22.2 
  FDP 43420  13  19.0 12.4  21.22  6.98   -.082  .326   -0.25  .20   19.6 
  CVP 43520  13  10.1 16.3   2.40  4.65    .635  .239 2.66  .13    6.6 
  SVP 43810  12   9.9 13.0   9.91  5.03   -.044  .310   -0.14 -.02    9.5 
 
United Kingdom LAB 51320  15 -25.8 13.8 -31.31 11.54   -.210  .385   -0.55  .23  -25.9 
   LIB 51420  15  -8.4 12.9  -9.54  4.44   -.118  .287   -0.41  .06   -8.5 
   CON 51620  15   7.9 18.8   2.04  3.57    .806  .185 4.36  .31   10.5 
 
United States DEM 61320  13 -12.8 11.5  -0.35  4.79    .817  .275 2.97 -.06   -1.9 
   REP 61620  13  13.9 14.5   8.21  5.41    .484  .281 1.72  .03   15.9 
 
 
Table entries for each of the 81 parties include: 
CMPid, the Comparative Manifesto Project party identification numerical code; party family is indicated by the third digit of 
the code—i.e., communist = 2; socialist/social democrat/labor = 3; liberal = 4; Christian = 5; conservative = 6; 
agrarian = 7; nationalist = 8; special interest/ethnic/regional = 9. 
N, number of consecutive elections for which there are coded left-right positions 
Mean, mean left-right position (left is negative; right is positive)  
std dev, standard deviation of left-right position 
a and sa, intercept and its standard error for dynamic equation estimate, where   for each party the estimated equation is LRt = 
a + bLRt-1 + et 
b and sb, slope and its standard error for dynamic equation estimate, where for each party the estimated equation is 
 LRt = a + bLRt-1 + et 
 t, t-value for the slope coefficient 
 rho, residual autocorrelation calculated as 1 – d/2, where d is Durbin-Watson d 
Target, estimated left-right position in the long run, calculated from the dynamic equation; target = a / (1 – b) 
   
